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Abstract
This paper reexamines the operating procedures of the Bank of
Japan (BOJ) and identiﬁes the monetary policy shock up to June 1995
by employing the structural VAR approach of Bernanke and Mihov
(1998). This approach identiﬁes exogenous components of monetary
policy by setting up equilibrium models of the reserve market. In this
way, it presents two equilibrium models, the Implicit Cost (IC) model
and the Credit Rationing (CR) model, which are distinguished by op-
posing views about the BOJ’s discount-window borrowing policy. The
IC model has the feature that the BOJ endogenously accommodates
the demand for discount-window borrowing by private banks. In con-
trast, the CR model has the feature that the BOJ exogenously controls
the level of discount-window lending. This paper demonstrates that
the CR model is superior to the IC model in describing the BOJ’s
operating procedures up to June 1995.
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1 Introduction
Analyzing monetary policy indicators that are controlled by central banks
and are closely related to the real economy has been one of the most im-
portant issues in macroeconomics. Some economists have studied short-
term interest rates such as the call rate and the federal funds rate, while
others have considered money supply variables such as M2+CD or high-
powered money. However, before we analyze monetary variables that some
economists presume as prospective policy indicators, the following questions
arise. How should we deal with the macroeconomic problem of specifying
adequate policy indicators, which precisely reﬂect central banks’ past pol-
icy decisions? Could we specify the policy indicators using single monetary
variables? If not, how should we specify them? This paper is motivated by
these questions. In particular, the present paper empirically explores the
best policy indicator of the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and identiﬁes the policy
shock by employing the structural VAR approach of Bernanke and Mihov
(1998). This approach allows us to specify adequate policy indicators of
central banks and clarify operating procedures by setting up equilibrium
econometric models of the reserve market. In general, central banks aim to
stabilize the macroeconomy by intervening in the reserve market and setting
short-term interest rates or reserves within a target range. The approach is
convincing because it assumes that monetary variables that are aﬀected by
the operating procedures of central banks in the reserve market embody the
decisions of central banks.
In a traditional structural VAR framework, the most convenient iden-
tiﬁcation scheme for exogenous components of monetary policy since the
work of Sims (1980) is the one based on Cholesky decompositions. If we
employ this identiﬁcation scheme, we must a priori select a single measure
of monetary policy and also specify a recursive structure for the macroecon-
omy. In VAR literature on Japanese monetary policy, Miyao (2000; 2002),
Ogawa (1999), and Hatakeda (1997) assume that the policy stance of the
BOJ can be measured by the call rate in order to examine Japan’s business
ﬂuctuations and the role of monetary policy. 1
In more recent work, Sims and Zha (1998) suggest an identifying method-
ology that does not depend on the recursive assumption and that imposes a
contemporaneous restriction on all economic variables in a VAR system. On
1In VAR literature on U.S. monetary policy, Christiano et al. (1996), Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992; 1995), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and Sims (1992) use the federal
funds rate or non-borrowed reserves as an policy indicator of the Federal Reserve in order
to investigate the eﬀects of monetary policy on the U.S. economy.
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the other hand, Sims (1986), Gordon and Leeper (1994), Leeper, Sims, Zha
(1996) impose a contemporaneous restriction on all economic variables in a
VAR system, particularly assuming that at least a subset of goods market
variabe are predetermined. We call this type of identiﬁcation scheme which
imposes a contemporaneous restriction on all economic variables in a VAR
system the “Sims scheme”.
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) suggest an identifying methodology that
divides the macroeconomy into a policy sector and a non-policy sector, and
that, assuming a block recursive structure between the two sectors, imposes
a contemporaneous restriction on monetary variables in the policy sector.
We call this identiﬁcation scheme the “Bernanke-Mihov scheme”.
These identiﬁcation schemes are more sophisticated than the Cholesky
approach in that they can quantitatively clarify a central bank’s operating
procedures and specify the policy indicator in the process of identifying the
policy shock. To investigate Japanese monetary policy, Shioji (2000) uses
the Sims scheme, while Kasa and Popper (1997) employ the Bernanke-Mihov
scheme. Shioji reports that the BOJ had targeted both the money supply,
such as M2+CD, and the short-term interest rates such as the call rate until
June 1995. Kasa and Popper point out that the BOJ had targeted both non-
borrowed reserves and the call rate. These studies conclude that the BOJ
had not targeted a single variable, but a mixed monetary variable. According
to this view, if we use a single monetary variable as the policy indicator of
the BOJ, conjectures about the monetary transmission mechanism would
be erroneous. This paper, presenting an econometric model of the Japanese
reserve market that is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of Kasa and Popper,
reexamines the policy indicator of the BOJ.
When examining the BOJ’s operating procedures and modeling the Japa-
nese reserve market, it should be noted that short-term interest rates such as
the call rate had remained above the discount rate until June 1995. 2 This
led to two views on the BOJ’s discount-window policy and caused diﬃculties
in understanding its operating procedures and in modeling the reserve mar-
ket. One is the “Implicit Cost Hypothesis”, which assumes that the BOJ
endogenously accommodates the demand for borrowing by private banks.
The other is called the “Credit Rationing Hypothesis”, which assumes that
the BOJ exogenously controls the level of discount-window lending. From
the 1980s to the early 1990s, economists and policy makers discussed which
2Strictly speaking, there are exceptional periods in which the call rate is below or
equal to the discount rate, such as from May 1972 to September 1972. However, since
these periods are short, they have practically no inﬂuence on the subsequent analysis. For
details, see Honda (1984).
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of these views was true, but failed to reach an agreement. Further, since
lowering the call rate below the discount rate in July 1995, the BOJ has
adopted the new framework for its operating procedures. Therefore, there
is no consensus about how the BOJ implemented its operations in the re-
serve market up to June 1995, and we have very little knowledge about how
the BOJ inﬂuenced the macroeconomy by operating in the market. 3 In this
paper, we present two equilibrium models of the Japanese reserve market,
which are diﬀerentiated by opposing views about the BOJ’s discount-window
policy, and deal with the following three problems in economics:
1. How did the BOJ implement its operations in the reserve market until
June 1995?
2. How can we characterize the policy shock and indicator of the BOJ
up to June 1995?
3. To what extent did the policy shock of the BOJ inﬂuence the macroe-
conomy?
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how we should
understand the BOJ’s discount-window policy up to June 1995 in order to
model the reserve market. Furthermore, in this section, we brieﬂy review the
studies of Shioji and Kasa-Popper. Section 3 demonstrates the VAR-based
methodology suggested by Bernanke and Mihov. Section 4 presents two
alternative equilibrium models of the Japanese reserve market, which are
diﬀerentiated by opposing views about the BOJ’s discount-window policy.
Section 5 discusses the estimation method and the results, and explores
the best policy indicator of the BOJ. Section 6 discusses the extent to which
our identiﬁed policy shock inﬂuences the macroeconomy by deriving impulse
responses functions. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Issues
2.1 Debates About the BOJ’s Discount-Window Policy
In general, central banks have two ways of controlling the supply of high-
powered money. One is via open-market operations and the other is via
3Nakashima (2004) examines the BOJ’s operating procedures from July 1995 by em-
ploying the Bernanke-Mihov approach. He concludes that the BOJ equally targeted the
call rate and reserves. Further, he asserts that an equally weighted average of the call rate
and reserves should be used as the BOJ’s policy indicator from July 1995.
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discount-window lending. In particular, the problems of modeling the Japanese
reserve market involve how we should understand the BOJ’s discount-window
policy. This is because the discount rate remained below short-term interest
rates such as the call rate until June 1995. This led to two diﬀerent views
on the BOJ’s discount-window policy.
One view assumes that there are surveillance costs of discount-window
borrowing for private banks other than the discount rate. According to this
view, the BOJ implicitly imposed surveillance costs, which increase with the
amount of discount-window borrowing, on private banks. Further, the view
is that private banks borrowed from the BOJ to the point at which the sum
of the implicit costs and the discount rate equaled the call rate. This type of
hypothesis about the BOJ’s discount-window policy is generally called the
“Implicit Cost Hypothesis”.
The other view assumes that the cost of discount-window borrowing
to private banks is only the discount rate. According to this view, if the
BOJ had not rationed discount-window lending among private banks, ra-
tional behavior by the private banks would have equated the call rate and
the discount rate because of ﬁnancial substitution of discount-window bor-
rowing from call money. Further, the view is that the fact that the call
rate remained above the discount rate indicates that the BOJ exogenously
rationed discount-window lending and regulated the quantity of borrowing.
This type of hypothesis about the BOJ’s discount-window policy is generally
called the “Credit Rationing Hypothesis”.
The implicit cost hypothesis is the standard view on the discount-window
policy of the Federal Reserve (FED). 4 In the context of the BOJ’s discount-
window policy, Furukawa (1985) supports this view on the basis of theoret-
ical and empirical analysis. On the other hand, Hamada and Iwata (1980)
and Honda (1984) each developed theoretical models of the credit rationing
view, and the former used empirical analysis to support this view.
This overview of the controversy about the BOJ’s discount-window pol-
4Strongin (1995) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) construct econometric models of the
U.S. reserve market based on the implicit cost hypothesis. This is because, in addition to
the fact that the federal fund rate is above the discount rate, “Regulation A” for discount-
window borrowing is applicable. This regulation requires that discount-window borrowing
involves exercising a non-transferable option to borrow again in the near future and that
private banks do not have unlimited borrowing privileges. Further, the regulation does
not allow private banks to lend in the federal funds market and borrow from the discount
window at the same time. Because of these restrictions, private banks are reluctant to
borrow from the discount window. In particular, Regulation A corresponds to the implicit
costs hypothesis in their analyses of U.S. monetary policy. See Sawayama (1990, Chapter
2) and Ichikawa (1994) on Regulation A.
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icy up to June 1995 strongly suggests that we should empirically judge the
two views by constructing econometric models of the short-run money mar-
ket that are diﬀerentiated by the opposing views, rather than to a priori
judge the views.
2.2 The Problems of Shioji (2000)
Shioji (2000) analyzes the operating procedures of the BOJ up to June
1995 by employing the Sims scheme, which imposes a contemporaneous
restriction on all economic variables in a VAR system. As regards operating
procedures, he addresses the issue of whether the BOJ inﬂuenced the high-
powered money market using high-powered money both via open-market
operations and discount-window lending, or whether the BOJ inﬂuenced the
market by changing the composition of the supply of high-powered money,
particularly in the form of discount-window lending. He calls the former
the “H (High-Powered Money) model” and the latter the “BL (Bank of
Japan Loans) model” and ﬁnds empirical support for the H model. As for
the policy indicator of the BOJ, he points out the possibility that the BOJ
targeted not a single monetary variable, but both short-term interest rates
such as the call rate and monetary aggregates such as M2+CD. Thus, he
characterizes the BOJ’s policy rule as a “partial accommodation rule”. The
problem with Shioji’s analysis is that he does not refer to the “Implicit
Cost Hypothesis” or the “Credit Rationing Hypothesis” despite presenting
econometric models that are diﬀerentiated by these opposing views of the
BOJ’s discount-window policy. Both the “Implicit Cost Hypothesis” and
the “Credit Rationing Hypothesis” have microfoundations and have been
discussed by academics. It is not clear whether his models correctly reﬂect
these two hypotheses or what type of theoretical models he assumes.
2.3 The Problems of Kasa and Popper (1997)
Kasa and Popper (1997) applied the Bernanke-Mihov approach to Japanese
monetary policy. They deﬁned “Moral Suasion” as the spread between in-
terbank rates such as the Tegata rate and open-market rates such as the CD
rate, and characterized the gap between the two types of rates as implicit
regulations that prohibited arbitrage between the markets. They included
“Moral Suasion” in their VAR model to examine the BOJ’s operating pro-
cedures. There are three problems with their analysis. Firstly, they use the
concept of “non-borrowed reserves”, which are total reserves (member-bank
deposits + vault cash) less discount-window borrowing. Non-borrowed re-
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serves are a key instrument of the FED’s operating procedures, but the BOJ
has never used the concept of non-borrowed reserves. Thus, they do not take
account of institutional diﬀerences between Japan and the U.S. Secondly,
the trends in prices (the consumer price index) and the exchange rate are
eliminated by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences, while those in output (the industrial
production indicator) and reserves are eliminated by using a quadratic time
trend. Therefore, their analysis adopts arbitrary transformations of macroe-
conomic variables. Thirdly, since they do not derive impulse response func-
tions, it is diﬃcult to assess the reliability of the identiﬁed monetary policy
shock.
In this section, we have discussed problems for identifying the policy
shock of the BOJ. In the following sections, we apply the Bernanke-Mihov
approach to Japanese monetary policy and identify the policy shock of the
BOJ.
3 The Bernanke-Mihov Approach
To derive the Bernanke-Mihov approach formally, we follow them in sup-
posing that the economy is described by the linear structural model given
in equations (1) and (2):
Y t =
k∑
i=0
BiY t−i +
k∑
i=0
CiP t−i +Ayv
y
t (1)
P t =
k∑
i=0
DiY t−i +
k∑
i=0
GiP t−i +Apv
p
t (2)
where variables in bold type denote vectors or matrices.
Also, following Bernanke and Mihov, we refer to Y and P as “non-
policy” and “policy” variables, respectively. The set of policy variables in-
cludes variables that are potentially useful as direct indicators of the stance
of monetary policy, e.g., short-term interest rates and reserve measures.
Non-policy variables include other economic variables, such as output and
inﬂation, the responses of which to monetary policy shocks we would like
to identify. In equations (1) and (2), the v s are mutually uncorrelated
“structural” or “primitive” disturbances. As in Bernanke and Mihov, these
structural disturbances are pre-multiplied by general matricesA, which per-
mit any disturbance in the Y block to enter into any equation in that block,
and similarly for the P block. Thus, no restrictions are placed on the co-
variance matrices of composite error terms within a block. In particular, we
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focus on the elements of the vector vpt in order to identify monetary policy
shocks, and assume that vpt includes the following structural shocks:
1. Treasury demand shock, vgdt ;
2. Currency demand shock to the macroeconomy, vcut ;
3. Reserve demand shock of private banks, vdt ;
4. Demand shock of discount-window borrowing by private banks, vbt ,
(Supply shock of discount-window lending by the BOJ); 5
5. High-powered money supply shocks via open-market operations
by the BOJ, vst .
To identify these structural shocks and the responses of variables in the
system to monetary policy shocks, we make a timing assumption. Following
Bernanke and Mihov, we assume that the structural shocks do not aﬀect
variables in the non-policy block within the period, i.e., C0 = 0. Under this
assumption, the system (1)-(2) can be written in standard VAR format as:
Y t =
k∑
i=1
HyiY t−i +
k∑
i=1
HpiP t−i + u
y
t (3)
P t =
k∑
i=1
JyiY t−i +
k∑
i=1
JpiP t−i + [(I −G0)−1D0uyt + upt ] (4)
where uyt denote the VAR residuals corresponding to the Y block and u
p
t
are the residuals corresponding to the P block, orthogonalized with respect
to uyt . Bernanke and Mihov show that:
upt = (I −G0)−1Apvpt (5)
where the right-hand-side parameters and disturbances are as deﬁned in
structural equation (2). Alternatively, dropping subscripts and superscripts,
we can write equation (5) as:
(I −G)u = Av (6)
Equation (6) is a standard structural VAR system, which relates observ-
able VAR-based innovations, u, to unobservable structural shocks, v.
5As shown below, in the IC model, we deﬁne vbt as the demand shock of discount-
window borrowing by private banks. In the CR model, we deﬁne vbt as the supply shock
of discount-window lending by the BOJ.
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Table 1: BOJ’s Balance Sheet with the IC model
Assets Liabilities
Discount-window Lending (ubr) Government Deposits (ugd)
Assets Held via Open-Market Operations Currency Held by the Public (ucu)
(Security, Float, Other Net Assets) (umo) Member-Bank Deposits (ure)
In the next section, we present two equilibrium models of the Japanese
reserve market that are diﬀerentiated by opposing views on the BOJ discount
borrowing policy to identify the elements of the vector v.
4 Two Equilibrium Models of the Reserve Market
In this section, we present two equilibrium models of the Japanese reserve
market that are diﬀerentiated by opposing views on the BOJ’s discount bor-
rowing policy up to June 1995. The model characterized by the implicit cost
hypothesis is the “Implicit Cost (IC) model”, while the one characterized
by the credit rationing hypothesis is named the “Credit Rationing (CR)
model”.
4.1 The Implicit Cost (IC) Model
We present the following system (7)-(12) as the Implicit Cost (IC) model.
ure = ubr + umo − ugd − ucu (7)
ugd = vgd (8)
ucu = −αur + vcu (9)
ure = −βur + vd (10)
ubr = γ(ur − udr) + vb (11)
umo = θgdvgd + θcuvcu + θdvd + θbvb + vs (12)
where gd, cu, re, br, and mo denote government deposits, currency, reserves,
borrowed reserves and assets held via open-market operations by the BOJ,
respectively, and r and dr denote the call rate and discount rate, respectively.
Equation (7) is the market equilibrium condition for bank reserves, which
is based on an identity between assets and liabilities on the BOJ’s balance
sheet (see Table 1). Equation (8) states that the BOJ accommodates ﬂuctu-
ations in the demand for government funds, vgd. Equation (9) relates inno-
vations in the demand for currency, ucu, to innovations in the call rate, ur,
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and an autonomous shock to the currency demand, vcu. Similarly, equation
(10) is the banks’ demand for reserves, expressed in the form of innovations:
it states that innovations in the demand for reserves, ure, depend negatively
on innovations in the call rate, ur, and on a demand disturbance, vd.
Equation (11) provides a contrast to the CR model, and states that the
BOJ passively accommodates the demand for discount-window borrowing
by private banks. In particular, note that the equation has two aspects:
one is a demand function of private banks, which indicates that innovations
in the demand for discount-window borrowing, ubr, depend on the spread
between innovations in the call rate, ur, and innovations in the discount rate,
udr, and on a shock to desired discount-window borrowing, vb. The other
aspect is the behavior function of the BOJ, which indicates that the BOJ
endogenously accommodates the demand for discount-window borrowing by
private banks.
Equation (12) is the behavior function of the BOJ, which indicates how
the BOJ supplies high-powered money using open-market operations. In
the IC model, only open-market operations are used by the BOJ to pro-
actively supply high-powered money. Therefore, the high-powered money
supply shock, vs, is deﬁned as the monetary policy shock of the BOJ in the
IC model.
Figure 1 illustrates the reserve market up to June 1995. For simplicity, we
assume that the interest elasticity of currency demand is equal to that of the
demand for reserves. Therefore, a negatively sloped demand curve for high-
powered money can be drawn (line D). The supply curve for high-powered
money in the IC model is drawn as line S-IC. When the call rate (R) is higher
than the discount rate (DR), the demand for discount-window borrowing by
private banks is positive. Hence, the demand curve for discount-window
borrowing in the IC model starts where the level of high-powered money
issued via open-market operations (MO) and the level of the discount rate
(DR) intersect. Note that γ > 0 is required in equation (11) and the inverse
of γ corresponds to the level of surveillance costs for the BOJ.
Following Bernanke and Mihov, we make the simplifying assumption
that the innovation to the discount rate, udr, is zero. 6 Consequently, we
can write the IC model in the form of equation (6) as follows:
6Bernanke and Mihov point out that the linear VAR framework may not be appropri-
ate for modeling the discount rate, which is an infrequently changed administered rate.
Further, they show that estimates from a model with a non-zero discount rate innovation
are quite consistent with those from a model with a zero discount rate innovation.
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I −G =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 α 0
0 0 1 β 0
1 1 1 −γ −1
0 0 0 0 1


, A =


1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
θgd θcu θd θb 1


u′ =
[
ugd ucu ure ur umo
]
, v′ =
[
vgd vcu vd vb vs
]
One can also invert the above relationship to determine how the mone-
tary policy shock, vs, depends on the VAR innovations:
vs = −(αθcu + βθd − γθb)ur + (θb + 1)umo
− (θb + θd)ure − (θb + θcu)ucu − (θb + θgd)ugd (13)
The IC model described by the above structural VAR system has 12
unknown parameters (including the variances of ﬁve structural shocks) to
be estimated from 15 covariances, Hence there are three overidentifying
restrictions.
4.2 The Credit Rationing (CR) Model
We present the following system (14)-(19) as the Credit Rationing (CR)
model.
ure = ubr + umo − ugd − ucu (14)
ugd = vgd (15)
ucu = −αur + vcu (16)
ure = −βur + vd (17)
ubr = φgdvgd + φcuvcr + φdvd + φsvs + vb (18)
umo = θgdvgd + θcuvcu + θdvd + θbvb + vs (19)
Compared with the IC model, the CR model has a diﬀerent structure
in equation (18). Indeed, equation (14) is the market equilibrium condition
for bank reserves, and equation (15) implies that the BOJ passively accom-
modates ﬂuctuations in the demand for government funds. Equations (16)
and (17) indicate the currency and reserve demand functions, respectively.
Equation (19) is the function showing the open-market operations behavior
of the BOJ.
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Table 2: The BOJ’s Balance Sheet with the CR Model
Assets Liabilities
Discount-window Lending Government Deposits (ugd)
+ Currency Held by the Public (ucu)
Assets Held via Open-market Operations (umd) Member-bank Deposits (ure)
Equation (18) characterizes the CR model, and states that the BOJ
controls the level of discount-window lending and rations lending to private
banks. Hence, we can interpret this equation as a second behavior function
for the BOJ. In particular, it should be noted that vb represents the supply
shock of discount-window lending in the CR model, while it indicates the
demand shock of discount-window borrowing by private banks in the IC
model. Therefore, vb can be considered the second monetary policy shock
of the BOJ, with vs in equation (19) being the ﬁrst.
Consider again Figure 1. The BOJ lending function, given by equation
(18), can be drawn parallel to the vertical line MO, which is the high-powered
money supply curve corresponding to open-market operations. As a result,
the high-powered money supply curve for the BOJ can be drawn as the
vertical line S-CR in the CR model.
In contrast to the IC model, the CR model implies that the BOJ aﬀects
the short-run money market and the macroeconomy both via open-market
operations and discount-window lending, because the model has two BOJ
behavior functions. Further, the two BOJ behavior functions are essentially
equivalent in that they are high-powered money supply functions of the
BOJ. Therefore, in the CR model, the quantity of high-powered money is
important when considering the monetary transmission mechanism, whereas
the diﬀerence between open-market operations and discount-window lend-
ing, as measures of supplying high-powered money, is not. 7 Hence, adding
equations (18) and (19) yields the following system, which is essentially
equivalent to the CR model.
ure = uboj − ugd − ucu (20)
ugd = vgd (21)
ucu = −αur + vcu (22)
7This is also apparent from the fact that a vertical high-powered money supply curve
is drawn in the CR model. As expected from this vertical supply curve, the BOJ can
inﬂuence the interest rate by changing the quantity of high-powered money. Further,
private banks are indiﬀerent to the form in which high-powered money is supplied.
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ure = −βur + vd (23)
umd = ψgdvgd + ψcuvcr + ψdvd + vmd (24)
Here, the VAR innovation umd is deﬁned as follows:
umd = ubr + umo
Equation (20) is the market equilibrium condition for bank reserves, which
is based on an identity between assets and liabilities on the BOJ’s balance
sheet (see Table 2). Equation (24) is the function showing how the BOJ
supplies high-powered money using open-market operations and discount
window lending. Consequently, the above system can be represented in the
form of equation (6) as follows:
I −G =


1 0 0 0
0 1 α 0
−1 −1 β 1
0 0 0 1

 , A =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
ψgd ψcu ψd 1


u′ =
[
ugd ucu ur umd
]
, v′ =
[
vgd vcu vd vmd
]
Inverting the above relationship shows how the monetary policy shock,
vmd, depends on the VAR innovations:
vmd = −(αψcu + βψd)ur − (ψd − 1)ure − (ψcu − 1)ucu − (ψgd − 1)ugd (25)
We estimate the CR model and identify the monetary policy shock, vmd.
The CR model described by the above system has nine unknown parameters
(including the variances of four structural shocks) to be estimated from 10
covariances. Hence, there is one overidentifying restriction. The IC and
CR models are non-nested within each other. Therefore, by testing the
overidentifying restrictions, we compare each model statistically.
4.3 Alternative Models for BOJ Operating Procedures
The structural parameters in the BOJ behavior functions, given by equation
(12) in the IC model and by equation (24) in the CR model, deﬁne how
the BOJ controls the market for bank reserves in each model. Hence, by
imposing parametric restrictions on equations (12) and (24), respectively,
we propose three alternative models that are nested within the IC and CR
models.
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The CL Model (Call Rates Targeting Model)
Imposing the following four parametric restrictions on the BOJ behavior
function in the IC model, equation (12),
θgd = 1, θcu = 1, θd = 1, θb = −1,
the monetary policy shock becomes vs = (α+β + γ)ur. On the other hand,
imposing the following three parametric restrictions on the BOJ behavior
function in the CR model, equation (24),
ψgd = 1, ψcu = 1, ψd = 1,
the monetary policy shock becomes vmd = −(α + β)ur. These parametric
restrictions imply that the BOJ fully oﬀsets demand shocks such as treasury
and currency demand shocks in the market for bank reserves and stabilizes
the call rate. Therefore, the model indicates that the BOJ targets the call
rate, and that the best policy indicator of the BOJ is the call rate. We call
this model the “CL model”. Further, we perform tests of the overidentifying
restrictions and hypothesis tests on the structural parameters in the process
of estimating the model.
The HP Model (High-Powered Money Targeting Model)
Imposing the following three parametric restrictions on the BOJ behavior
function (24) in the CR model,
ψgd = 1, ψcu = 0, ψb = 0,
the monetary policy shock becomes vmd = ure + ucu = uhp. The model
indicates that the BOJ targets high-powered money, and that the best policy
indicator of the BOJ is high-powered money. We call this model the “HP
model”. As already discussed, the IC model assumes that the quantity
of BOJ discount-window lending, which is a speciﬁc component of high-
powered money, is determined by private banks. Thus, in the IC model,
only the total quantity of high-powered money cannot theoretically be a
policy instrument of the BOJ. Consequently, the HP model is not derived
from the IC model. 8
8This can been seen from the fact that the monetary policy shock, vs, cannot reduce
to the unanticipated change in high-powered money in equation (13). According to the
implicit cost hypothesis, central banks cannot control the amount of high-powered money,
but can inﬂuence call rates. See Horiuchi (1980, Chapter 2) for a discussion.
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The MIX Model
By imposing the following three parametric restrictions on the BOJ behavior
function (12) in the IC model,
θgd = 1, θcu = θd, θb = −1,
the monetary policy shock becomes vs = −{(α+β)θcu+γ}ur+(1−θcu)uhp.
Imposing the following two parametric restrictions on the BOJ behavior
function (24) in the CR model,
ψgd = 1, ψcu = ψd,
the monetary policy shock becomes vmd = −{(α+β)ψcu}ur +(1−ψcu)uhp.
The model implies that as the values of θcu = θd or ψcu = ψd approach
unity, the importance of the call rate to the BOJ increases, while as the
values approach zero, the importance of high-powered money to the BOJ
increases. 9 We call the above model the “MIX model”.
In the following section, we examine the BOJ’s operating procedures by
estimating the above three alternative models as well as the IC and CR
models.
5 Estimation and Results
In this section, we estimate the models of the market for bank reserves and
report the results.
5.1 Estimation and VAR Models
For estimation of the structural VAR system (6), we use a two-step pro-
cedure. The ﬁrst step is equation-by-equation estimation by OLS of the
coeﬃcients of the reduced-form VAR system (3)-(4). The VAR innovations
of the policy sector u  are given by the orthogonal complement of the pro-
jection of the OLS residuals of the policy sector on the OLS residuals of the
non-policy sector. In the second step, full information maximum likelihood
estimation (FIML) is applied. The log likelihood function to be maximized
is as follows:
L(I −G,A,Σ

) = −(T/2){log|I −G|2 − log|A|2 − log|Σ

|2}
− (T/2)trace{(I −G)′(A−1)′Σ

−1A−1(I −G)Σ

} (26)
9Even if the value of θcu = θd approach zero, the mix model within the IC model does
not reduce to the HP model, in which the BOJ targets only high-powered money.
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where Σ

is the estimate of the covariance matrix of the VAR innovations
of the policy sector, and Σ

is the diagonal matrix that diagonally locates
the variances of the structural shocks. We apply the two-step procedure to
estimate the two models of the market for bank reserves, and to identify the
monetary policy shocks. 10
As we discussed in section 3, the Bernanke-Mihov methodology accom-
modates the inclusion of both policy variables and non-policy variables in
the VAR system (3)-(4). For estimation of both the IC and CR models, the
industrial production index (IIP, 1995 = 100, seasonally adjusted), the con-
sumer price index (CPI, 1995 = 100), the Nikkei commodity prices index
(PCOM, 42 items), money stock (M2+CD, seasonally adjusted), and the
exchange rate (EX, yen per U.S. dollar) are included as the non-policy vari-
ables. The index of commodity prices is included to capture the expected
future course of inﬂation. 11 We take natural logs of the non-policy vari-
ables. CPI and PCOM are seasonally adjusted by using the X12-ARIMA
method.
Next, we discuss the variables of the policy sector in the VAR system.
As we explained in section 4, the development of equilibrium models of the
market for bank reserves involves the use of the identitical relations between
assets and liabilities in the BOJ’s balance sheet (see Table 1 and 2). Further,
the estimation of the IC model requires the ﬁve VAR innovations of the
policy sector (ugd, ucu, ure, ur, umo), and that of the CR model requires
the four VAR innovations of the policy sector (ugd, ucu, ur, umd). We must
carefully pick out monetary variables of the policy sector to generate these
VAR innovations via the ﬁrst-step OLS estimation.
In the IC model, government deposits (GD), currency (CU) and reserves
(RE) are used for liabilities. In addition, “the assets held via open-market
operations (MO)”, which comprise bills, bonds and overseas assets acquired
10Bernanke and Mihov (1995; 1998) apply the eﬃcient generalized method of moments
(GMM) in the second-step estimation, while Kasa and Popper apply FIML. If the VAR in-
novations are normally distributed, estimates by eﬃcient GMM are asymptotically equiv-
alent to those obtained by FIML. For details, see Bernanke and Mihov (1995, Appendix2)
and Watson (1994). Equation (26) is estimated with the BFGS algorithm in the Con-
strained Maximum Likelihood Estimation (CML) package of GAUSS.
11As is well known, the exclusion of indicators of future inﬂation such as the commodity
prices index and the oil price index tends to lead to the “price puzzle”, which is the
ﬁnding that monetary tightening leads to a rising rather than a falling price level. Finding
indicators of future inﬂation is an important issue in macroeconomics. However, following
Sims (1992), Kasa and Popper (1997), and Bernanke and Mihov (1998), among others,
we use the commodity prices index as an indicator of future inﬂation. For details of the
price puzzle, see Sims (1992).
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by the BOJ through these operations, are used for assets. 12 In addition to
these four variables, the call rate (R) is included in the policy sector. There-
fore, in the IC model, we estimate the ten-variable VAR system composed
of the ﬁve non-policy variables (IIP, CPI, PCOM, M2+CD, EX) and the
ﬁve monetary variables in the policy sector (GD, CU, RE, R, MO).
The estimation of the CR system (20)-(24) and the identiﬁcation of the
monetary policy shocks, vmd, require the preparation of the four VAR in-
novations of the policy sector: ugd, ucu, ur and umd. Here, we propose two
identiﬁcation schemes to generate these four innovations. One involves es-
timating the ten-variable VAR system of the IC model, and using the ﬁve
generated innovations of the policy sector: ugd, ucu, ure, ur and umo. Firstly,
we generate ubr with equation (7). Next, after generating umd by adding ubr
and umo, we estimate the CR system of equations (20)-(24) through FIML.
This identiﬁcation scheme does not allow us to fully identify the entire sys-
tem of the CR model, or to derive estimated impulse response functions
from the CR model, because we have no choice to indirectly identify the
monetary policy shocks, vmd, via estimation of the ten-variable VAR sys-
tem of the IC model. Nonetheless, the identiﬁcaton scheme enables us to
compare the IC system of equations (7)-(12) and the CR system of equa-
tions (20)-(24), focusing particularly on the contemporaneous restriction on
the the structural VAR system (6); hence the identiﬁcation scheme is useful
for a head to head comparison between the IC and CR systems. We call
this identiﬁcation scheme the “Partial Identiﬁcation (PI)”, and call the CR
model estimated under the PI scheme the “Partially Identiﬁed CR (PI-CR)
model”. In the following subsections (section 5.2 and 5.3), we mainly use
the PI-CR model to compare the performance of the IC and CR systems,
and to examine the BOJ’s operating procedures to June 1995.
The other identiﬁcation scheme involves constructing another VAR sys-
tem which is diﬀrent from the VAR system of the IC model only for the
CR model. Firstly, in the VAR system of the CR model, GD and CU are
used for liabilities. Furthermore, “ the assets held via open-market oper-
ations and discount-window lending (MD)”, which are formed by adding
BOJ loans to MO, are used for assets. 13 In addition to the above three
12For details of MO, see Appendix A.
13For details of MD, see Appendix A. Normalizing the policy-sector variables except for
R raises the problem of the normal method of using log levels that violate the identical
relation between assets and liabilities: see equations (7) and (20). In particular, Strongin
(1995) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998), who identify the FED’s policy shock by con-
structing a model of the U.S. market for bank reserves, point out this problem. Strongin
suggests that the policy-sector variables should be normalized by using the lag of total
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variables, R is included in the policy sector. Therefore, in this identiﬁcation
scheme, we use the nine-variable VAR system composed of the ﬁve non-
policy variables (IIP, CPI, PCOM, M2+CD, EX) and the four monetary
variables in the policy sector (GD, CU, R, MD). 14 Unlike the PI scheme,
this identiﬁcation scheme allows us to fully identify the entire system of the
CR model, or to attempt impulse response analysis for evaluation of the CR
hypothesis, because it can directly generates the four VAR innovations of
the policy sector via the OLS estimation of the nine-variable VAR system.
We call this identiﬁcation scheme the ”Full Identiﬁcation (FI)”, and call the
CR model estimated under the FI scheme the ”Fully Identiﬁed CR (FI-CR)
model”. Compared with the PI-CR model, the FI-CR model is less suitable
for a head to head comparison between the IC system (7)-(12) and the CR
system (20)-(24) because of the non-nested structure attributed to diﬀerent
number of variables within the VAR systems of the IC and FI-CR mod-
els. Nonethless, the FI-CR model, including the new variable MD, accords
more with the assumption of the CR hypothesis for monetary transmission
mechanism, mentioned in subsection 4.2, that the quantity of high-powered
money is important, whereas measures of supplying high-powered money is
not, than the PI-CR model does. 15 Further, the FI-CR model comforms
with the received way of VAR analysis, in which, one uses esimated impulse
response functions to evaluate models or hypotheses in question. In section
6, we make a comparison between the IC and CR hypotheses not only by
using the estimation results from the IC and FI-CR models, but also by
using the estimated impulse response functions from the two models.
reserves. Bernanke and Mihov normalize the policy-sector variables by using a 36-month
moving average of total reserves. Bernanke and Mihov’s normalization appears arbitrary
because no basis for using the “36-month” moving average is oﬀered. Therefore, following
Strongin, we normalize the policy-sector variables (seasonally adjusted) by using the lag
of monetary base (seasonally adjusted). In addition, the author estimates the IC and CR
models using the standardized variables with lagged reserves or currency. The method of
standardizing with these variables does not materially aﬀect the following results.
14The two equiribrium conditions, given by equations (7) and (20), require that one of
the policy-sector variables, except for the call rate (R), be redundant. Therefore, in the
IC model, we exclude borrowed reserves (BR) following Bernanke-Mihov (1998), while in
the CR model estimated under the identiﬁcation scheme, we exclude reserves (RE).
15For the contemporaneous relationships between policy-sector variables described by
the CR system (20)-(24), the PI-CR model retains the non-dependency of monetary trans-
mission mechanism on measures of supplying high-powered money, an implication of the
CR hypothesis, whereas for the dynamics of macroeconomy described by the VAR system
(3)-(4), it does not. On the other hand, The FI-CR model retains the non-dependency
assumption both for the contemporaneous relationships between policy-sector variables
and for the dynamics of macroeconomy, and thereby we can derive estimated impulse
response functions from the model.
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To determine the number of lags in the VAR systems, we apply the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). This criterion leads to the use of four
lags in the ten-variable VAR system of the IC model and ﬁve lags in the
nine-variable VAR system of the FI-CR model. 16 All the data are obtained
from the Nikkei NEEDS, and the sample period is January 1975 to June
1995.
5.2 Comparison of the IC and CR Systems
In the following subsections, we mainly focus on estimation results from
the IC and the Partially Identiﬁed CR (PI-CR) models, the ﬁrst-step OLS
estimation of which is based on the use of the same VAR system, to attempt a
head to head comparison between the IC system (7)-(12) and the CR system
(20)-(24). Through the comparison, we explore the best policy indicator of
the BOJ and examine the BOJ’s operating procedures to June 1995.
Estimates of the IC model are given in Table 3, and estimates of the
PI-CR model is given in the upper panel of Table 4. Each table reports
parameter estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. The ﬁnal two
columns of Tables 3 and 4 show, for all of the overidentiﬁed models sug-
gested in Sections 3 and 4: (1) a p-value corresponding to the test of the
overidentifying restrictions (OIR); and (2) a p-value for the parameter re-
strictions of the models nested within the IC and CR systems such as the CL,
HP, and MIX models (JOINT). Any p-values greater than 0.05 are shown
in bold type, and indicate that the particular model cannot be rejected at
the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance.
Firstly, we report the parameter estimates of the demand functions in
the IC and PI-CR models. The slope coeﬃcients of the currency demand
function, α, is signiﬁcant and correctly signed in the IC and PI-CR models.
The slope coeﬃcient of the reserves demand function, β, is of the correct
sign, but is insigniﬁcant in both the IC and PI-CR models. The slope
coeﬃcient of the borrowing function in the IC model, γ, is of the correct
sign, but is insigniﬁcant.
Next, we report the parameter estimates of the BOJ behavior functions
in the IC and PI-CR models. In the IC model, for the BOJ behavior function
corresponding to open-market operations, θgd, θd, and θb are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, but θcu is not. In the PI-CR model, for the BOJ behav-
16In addition to using the number of lags selected by AIC, the author estimates the
VAR systems with three, four, ﬁve, six, and seven lags. The order of the VARs does not
materially aﬀect the results. The results reported are those obtained by using the number
of lags selected by AIC.
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ior function corresponding to both open-market operations and discount-
window lending, all the parameter estimates are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero. Of particular interest in the PI-CR model is the ﬁnding that the pa-
rameter estimates of the BOJ behavior function are close to unity, implying
that the BOJ fully oﬀsets demand shocks in the market for bank reserves
and aims to stabilize the call rate.
Tests of the overidentifying restrictions show the following. The IC model
is rejected at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. The PI-CR model is not
rejected at the ﬁve percent levels of signiﬁcance, but is rejected at the ten
percent levels of signiﬁcance. Judging solely by the p-values, the CR system
(20)-(24) appears to be superior to the IC system (7)-(12).
5.3 Estimates of the BOJ’s Operating Procedures
Here, we report the estimates of the three overidentiﬁed models that are
generated from the IC and PI-CR models.
Firstly, we report the estimates of the CL model. In the ﬂamework of
the IC model, the CL model is strongly rejected at the ﬁve percent level of
signiﬁcance. Further, the parameter estimates for the currency, reserves, and
borrowed reserves demand functions are of the incorrect sign. In contrast, in
the ﬂamework of the PI-CR model, the CL model is not rejected. Further,
the parameter estimates of the currency and reserves demand functions are
of the correct sign and precisely estimated. This result is consistent with
the ﬁnding that in the PI-CR model, the parameter estimates of the BOJ
behavior function are close to unity.
Next, we report the estimates of the HP model within the PI-CR model.
The slope coeﬃcients of the demand functions appear reasonable. Indeed,
the slope coeﬃcient of the currency demand function are of the correct
sign. In addition, the slope of the reserves demand function is of the correct
sign and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As the p-values of the OIR and
JOINT tests show, the HP model is strongly rejected. However, this result
is consistent with the ﬁnding that in the PI-CR model, the CL model, which
assumes that the BOJ targets only the call rate, is easily accepted.
We report the estimates of the MIX model. In the ﬂamework of the IC
model, the MIX model is easily rejected (as was the CL model), although
all of the parameter estimates are of the correct sign. In contrast, in the
ﬂamework of the PI-CR model, the MIX model is easily accepted and the
parameter estimates appear reasonable. Indeed, the slope coeﬃcients of
the currency and reserves demand functions are of the correct sign and are
signiﬁcant. In addition, for the parameter estimates of the BOJ behavior
20
function, φcu = φd is close to unity, and the restriction that φgd = 1.0 and
φcu = φd is not rejected at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. These results
imply the BOJ fully accommodates the three demand shocks (vgd, vcu, vd),
both via open-market operations and via discount-window lending.
The estimation results can be summarized as follows. In the ﬂamework
of the IC model, not only the IC model itself but also the two nested mod-
els are rejected at the ﬁve percent level of signiﬁcance. By contrast, in the
ﬂamework of the PI-CR model, both the CL and MIX models as well as the
the CR model itself are easily accepted, although the HP model is not. Fur-
ther, all the slope coeﬃcients of the two demand functions are of the correct
sign. In addition, compared with the IC model, the PI-CR model provides
a more consistent interpretation of the BOJ’s operating procedures, in that
the estimation results of the PI-CR model clearly implys that the BOJ tar-
geted only the call rate. Therefore, judging by the estimation results from
the IC and PI-CR models, the CR system (20)-(24) statistically outperforms
the IC system (7)-(12). 17
A review of the estimation results follows.
1. The PI-CR model outperforms the IC model and gives more consis-
tent estimates. This implies that the BOJ did not passively accom-
modate the demand for discount window borrowing by private banks,
but actively controlled the level of discount-window lending and ra-
tioned lending to private banks. Therefore, for the BOJ’s operating
procedures up to June 1995, we infer that the BOJ aﬀected the short-
run money market both via open-market operations and via discount-
window lending. 18
2. It is conceivable that unanticipated changes in the call rate represent
unanticipated changes in the BOJ’s policy stance. Therefore, we infer
that the BOJ targeted only the call rate, and that the call rate is the
best policy indicator of the BOJ.
6 Impulse Response Analysis
For the BOJ’s operating procedures, the estimation results of the IC and
the Partially Identiﬁed CR (PI-CR) models suggested the superiority of the
17As section 6 demonstrates, the estimation results of the Fully Identiﬁed CR (FI-CR)
model are fairly similar to those of the PI-CR model.
18Ueda (1993) states, “Therefore, discount-window lending has been rationed in Japan.
In addition, the level of lending has been changed by the BOJ, not by private banks”
(p.12, lines 17-19).
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CR hypothesis over the IC hypothesis. However, we do not wish to em-
phasize these estimates too much, because the partial identiﬁcation do not
strictly follow the traditional way of VAR analysis, in which, given identi-
ﬁed monetary policy shocks, one uses esimated impulse response functions
to evaluate models or hypotheses in question. In this section, we report
estimation results of the Fully Identiﬁed CR (FI-CR) model and estemated
impulse response functions from the model, focusing particularly on whether
the CR hypothesis still have validity to explain the BOJ’s operating proce-
dures. In addition, we reexamine the plausibility of the IC hypothesis using
estimated impulse response functions from the IC model.
6.1 Estimates of the Fully Identified CR model
Firstly, we report estimation results of the FI-CR model. Estimates of the
FI-CR models are given in the lower panels of Table 4. The estimation
results of this model are fairly similar to those of the PI-CR model. All
the slope coeﬃcients of the two demand functions are of the correct sign.
Further, the parameter estimates of the BOJ behavior function in the FI-CR
model are close to unity. In addition, the CL and MIX models as well as
the FI-CR model itseﬂ are easily accepted. As with the esimation results
of the PI-CR model, those of the FI-CR model clearly imply that the BOJ
targeted only the call rate.
Table 5 shows the contributions of four structural shocks to the variances
of government deposits (GD), currency (CU), the call rate (R), and the
BOJ’s assets held via open-market operations and discount-window lending
(MD) in the framework of the FI-CR model. The table shows that the
monetary policy shock, vmd, explains much of the variation in the call rate.
Moreover, the variation in MD reﬂects changes in the demand conditions
within the market, vgd, vcu, and vd. These results also imply that the BOJ
fully oﬀsets the three demand shocks to stabilize the call rate.
As with the estimaton results of the PI-CR model, those of the FI-CR
model also suggest that the CR hypothesis have varidity to explain the
BOJ’s operating procedures. The important point on comparison of the FI-
CR and PI-CR models, both of which are based on the CR hypothesis, is that
the two CR models have the same structure for the structural VAR system
(6), but have diﬀerent structure for the VAR system (3)-(4). The non-nested
structure attributed to diﬀerent number of variables within the VAR systems
of the FI-CR and PI-CR models does not allow us to statisitically compare
the performacne of the CR models without the use of the p-values of the
OIR and JOINT statistics. However, as long as both of the CR models
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are not rejected signiﬁcantly, and provide the same interpretation on the
BOJ’s operating procedures, we should not determine relative merit of the
two CR models using only the p-values. We therefore conﬁne our concern
with the estimation results of the FI-CR model to conﬁrming varidity of the
CR hypothesis. 19
6.2 Impulse Response Functions from the IC Model
Here, we report the esimated impulse response functions from the IC model.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response functions of the IC model. The left
column shows the estimated responses of the non-policy sector variables.
The right column shows the estimated responses of the policy-sector vari-
ables. For ease of interpretation, we consider an expansionary shock with an
impact eﬀect on the call rate of -100 basis points. Solid lines indicate point
estimates of impulse responses up to the 48th month. Dashed lines represent
one standard error band, computed by using a Monte Carlo integration with
1000 replications.
As shown in Figure 2, the responses of the price indicator, CPI, is subject
to the “Price Puzzle” because CPI responds to an expansionary policy shock
by going down. Further, the response of M2+CD is subject to the “Liquidity
Puzzle”, because M2+CD goes down in response to an expansionary policy
shock. Given these puzzles and the inconsistency of the estimation results
discussed in the previous section, the IC model is implausible.
6.3 Impulse Response Functions from the FI-CR Model
Figure 3 shows the estimated impulse response functions from the FI-CR
model. It should be noted that the price and liquidity puzzles that are
observed in the IC model are not observed in the FI-CR model. Thus,
19Unlike the PI-CR model, the FI-CR model retains the non-dependency of monetary
transmission mechanism on measures of supplying high-powered money, an implication
of the CR hypothesis, both for the contemporaneous relationships between policy-sector
variables described by the CR system (20)-(24) and for the dynamics of macroeconomy
described by the VAR system (3)-(4). As long as section 5 demonstrates that the PI-CR
model, which do not retain the non-dependency for the dynamics of macroeconomy, is
not rejected, we can not necessarly suggest, judging by the estimatin results of the FI-
CR model and the following estimated impulse response functions from the model, that
the non-dependency is applicable not only to the contemporaneous relationships between
policy-sector variables, also to the dynamics of macroeconomy. Hence, our suggetion
obtaiend from the estimation results of the FI-CR model is restricted to conﬁrmation that
the CR hypothesis have varidity to explain the BOJ’s operating procedures, even if we
use two diﬀerent CR models.
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we can examine the estimated impulse response functions from the FI-CR
model in detail.
Firstly, we report the estimated responses of the non-policy sector vari-
ables. The eﬀect of the expansionary policy shock to output (IIP) builds
gradually and reaches its peak after about one year, before declining back to
zero. The eﬀect of the CPI exhibits the “Nominal Rigidity”, which means
that the responses of the price indicators are zero for about a year follow-
ing a policy shock. 20 PCOM, which is an indicator of future inﬂation,
reaches its peak after about one year. This PCOM response is interesting in
that it emerges before the CPI. M2+CD immediately responds to the pol-
icy shock, as expected. The response of M2+CD indicates the “Liquidity
Eﬀect” and reaches its peak after about one year. In particular, the timing
of the M2+CD response is noteworthy because it corresponds to the esti-
mated timing of the eﬀect of the policy shock on output (IIP), and also to
the emergence of the eﬀect of the policy shock on the price indicator (CPI).
This implies that monetary policy works through the conventional money
demand mechanism. 21 The estimated response of the exchange rate (EX)
is insigniﬁcant. However, according to the point estimate, the response of
EX peaks after about 30 months and appears to be permanent.
Next, we report the estimated responses of the policy-sector variables.
We do not assess the estimated response of government deposits (GD), about
which we have no theoretical expectations. The estimated response of cur-
rency (CU) is erratic during the ﬁrst year after the immediate positive re-
sponse to the expansionary shock, but at about the one-year point, currency
begins to decline, following the movement of the call rate (R). The estimated
response of reserves (RE) is insigniﬁcant. However, according to the point
estimate, the response of RE indicates a liquidity eﬀect on the market for
bank reserves lasting about one year, following the movement of the eﬀects
of the expansionary shock on the call rate. 22 From the movement of R,
it is conceivable that the BOJ commits itself to expansionary policy for
20In the VAR literature on U.S. monetary policy, Christiano et al. (1996) also ﬁnd
one-year nominal rigidity in the response of price indicators.
21The present study does not address the controversy between the opposing credit and
money views of the monetary transmission mechanism. Ogawa (1999), Hatakeda (1997),
and Ueda (1993) examine this issue in detail.
22The impulse response of reserves (RE) is calculated by using the relation RE =
MD−GD−CU . Hayashi (2001) uses daily data and estimates structural-equation mod-
els to identify the liquidity eﬀect of the BOJ’s monetary policy on the Japanese interbank
market. Beaudry and Saito (1998) apply several methods, including a structural VAR ap-
proach, in order to identify the liquidity eﬀect of monetary policy, and make international
comparisons.
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about one year. For the BOJ’s assets held via open-market operations and
discount-window lending (MD), there is an erratic impulse for about six
months after the policy shock. This implies that the BOJ fully oﬀsets ﬂuc-
tuations in the demand for treasury funds, currency, and reserves in order
to stabilize the call rate.
A review of the above results follows.
1. The IC model suﬀers from price and liquidity puzzles, whereas the FI-
CR model does not suﬀer from these puzzles. Further, the estimates of
the FI-CR model shows validity of the CR hypothesis, as those of the
PI-CR model showed. Given these ﬁndings and the estimation results
in the previous section, the CR hypothesis is more plausible to explain
the BOJ’s operating procedures than the IC hypothesis.
2. In the FI-CR model, after an expansionary shock, output peaks af-
ter about one year before declining back to zero. The timing of the
estimated peak and decline of output corresponds to the estimated
timing of the “policy tightening”, which indicates that the call rate
becomes positive about one year after the expansionary shock. The
eﬀect on price exhibits the nominal rigidity for about one year and
reaches its peak in about 30 months. The response of reserves shows
up the liquidity eﬀect in the market for bank reserves for about one
year, following the movement of the eﬀects of the expansionary shock
to the call rate.
7 Conclusions
This paper draws three main substantive conclusions.
Firstly, with regard to its operating procedures up to June 1995, the
Bank of Japan (BOJ) fully oﬀset demand shocks in the market for bank
reserves and aimed to stabilize the call rate by using both open-market
operations and discount-window lending.
Secondly, the BOJ’s policy shock up to June 1995 emerges as unantici-
pated changes in the call rate. Therefore, we suggest that the call rate should
be identiﬁed as the best policy indicator of the BOJ up to June 1995. This
suggestion is especially noteworthy because Shioji, and Kasa and Popper
point out that no single operating procedure can explain the behavior of the
BOJ.
Thirdly, with regard to the eﬀects of the BOJ’s monetary policy shock
to the macroeconomy, the response of output reaches its peak after about
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one year before declining back to zero after about three years. The response
of price exhibits the nominal rigidity for about one year and reaches its peak
after about 30 months. The response of reserves exhibits the liquidity eﬀect
in the market for bank reserves for about one year following the shock to
the call rate.
These conclusions are obtained without splitting the sample from Jan-
uary 1975 to June 1995. However, the most attractive feature of the Bernanke-
Mihov approach is that the approach can determine how central banks
make decisions in response to the institutional and macroeconomic changes
surrounding monetary policy in each period, and what combinations of
monetary variables can explain the facts. Future reﬁnement requires that
Japanese monetary policy in each period be statistically conceptualized
by splitting the sample according to the institutional and macroeconomic
changes surrounding the BOJ.
Appendix A: Constructing MO and MD
?Construction of MO:
First, we apply X12-ARIMA to foreign assets (net), claims on gov-
ernment, claims on deposit money banks, lending to deposit-money
banks, and unclassiﬁed assets (net). Secondly, we subtract lending to
deposit-money banks (SA) from the claims on deposit-money banks
(SA). 23 The transformed data measure claims that the BOJ acquires
via open-market operations on deposit-money banks. Then, we deﬁne
the sum of the transformed data, foreign assets (SA), claims on govern-
ment (SA), and the unclassiﬁed assets (SA) as MO: the BOJ’s assets
held via open-markets operations. All the data are obtained from
Nikkei NEEDS (Monetary Survey, Accounts of Monetary Authority).
?Construction of MD:
After applying X12-ARIMA to lending to deposit-money banks, we
deﬁne the sum of the lending (SA) and MO as MD: the BOJ’s assets
held via open-market operations and discount-window lending.
23SA denotes seasonally adjusted data.
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Table 3: Estimation Results from the Implicit Cost (IC) Model
(1975:1-1995:6)
Models Demand Equations BOJ Equations OIR JOINT ?
α β γ ? θgd θcu θd θb
IC 2.293 0.001 0.004 1.054 0.050 1.091 -0.741 8.958 − ?(0.462) (0.001) (0.077) (0.044) (0.267) (0.133) (0.058) (0.029)
CL -0.064 -0.001 -0.011 1.000 1.000 1.000 -1.000 650.6 647.7(0.053) (0.002) (0.0012) (0.000) (0.000)
MIX 0.008 0.003 0.001 1.000 0.873 0.873 -1.000 136.0 352.3(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.124) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000)
1. For the parameter estimates of the Demand Equations and BOJ Equations, standard errors
are in parentheses.
2. OIR and Joint indicate overidentifying restrictions test statistics and joint test statistics,
respectively. p-values are in parentheses.
3. A likelihood ratio test is used to test the overidentifying restrictions. The degrees of
freedom are three for the IC model, seven for the CL model, and six for the MIX model.
4. For the CL model, likelihood ratio test statistics of the joint hypothesis that θgd = θcu =
θd = 1.0, θb = −1.0 are calculated using four degrees of freedom.
5. For the MIX model, likelihood ratio test statistics of the joint hypothesis that θgd =
1.0, θcu = θd, θb = −1.0 are calculated using three degrees of freedom.
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Table 4: Estimation Results from the Credit Rationing (CR) Model
(1975:1-1995:6)
Methods Models Demand Equations BOJ Equations OIR JOINT
α β ψgd ψcu ψd
PI
CR 0.003 0.020 0.994 0.926 0.932 2.768 −(0.002) (0.030) (0.021) (0.047) (0.082) (0.096)
CL 0.003 0.002 1.000 1.000 1.000 4.465 1.516(0.001) (0.001) (0.346) (0.678)
HP 0.004 0.063 1.000 0.000 0.000 156.7 153.7(0.003) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000)
MIX 0.007 0.003 1.000 0.899 0.899 3.409 1.055(0.005) (0.002) (0.114) (0.114) (0.332) (0.304)
FI
CR 0.008 0.004 1.026 0.954 0.888 0.644 −(0.010) (0.004) (0.018) (0.350) (0.089) (0.422)
CL 0.008 0.001 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.297 0.593(0.002) (0.001) (0.861) (0.897)
HP 0.546 0.006 1.000 0.000 0.000 99.27 98.57(0.820) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
MIX 0.008 0.002 1.000 0.905 0.905 0.769 0.528(0.005) (0.002) (0.119) (0.119) (0.856) (0.467)
1. PI and FI indicate partial identification and full identification, respectively.
2. For the parameter estimates of the Demand Equations and BOJ Equations, standard errors
are in parentheses.
3. OIR and Joint indicate overidentifying restrictions test statistics and joint test statistics,
respectively. p-values are in parentheses.
4. A likelihood ratio test is used to test the overidentifying restrictions. The degrees of
freedom are one for the CR model, four for the HP model, and three for the MIX model.
5. For the CL model, likelihood ratio test statistics of the joint hypothesis that ψgd = ψcu =
ψd = 1.0 are calculated with three degrees of freedom.
6. For the HP model, likelihood ratio test statistics of the joint hypothesis that ψgd =
1.0, ψcu = ψd = 0.0 are calculated with three degrees of freedom.
7. For the MIX model, likelihood ratio test statistics of the joint hypothesis that ψgd =
1.0, ψcu = ψd are calculated with two degrees of freedom.
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Table 5: Variance Decomposition from the FI-CR Model(%)
GD CU R MD
vgd 100.0 2.732 1.122 60.12
vcu 0.000 87.32 6.204 25.34
vd 0.000 1.321 2.194 14.32
vboj 0.000 8.267 90.48 0.219
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Figure 1: The Reserve Market up to June 1995.
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses of the Monetary Policy Shock for
the IC Model (1975:1-1995:6)
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1. The monetary policy shock is normalized so that it produces a 100-basis point decline in
the call rate on impact.
2. The solid line and the dashed line represent point estimates and standard errors of the
estimated impulse responses, respectively.
33
Figure 3: Impulse Responses of the Monetary Policy Shock for
the FI-CR Model (1975:1-1995:6)
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1. The monetary policy shock is normalized so that it produces a 100-basis point decline in
the call rate on impact.
2. The solid line and the dashed line represent point estimates and standard errors of the
estimated impulse responses, respectively.
3. Impulse response for RE (reserves) are calculated from RE=MD-GD-CU.
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